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Tuesday, May 10, 2016




UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT NEWS 2016
Willamette Law Online - Willamette University College of Law
From April 18, 2016 through May 9, 2016, the United States Supreme Court issued seven opinions and granted four certiorari summarized below. 
DECISIONS
(1) ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: States may not implement programs which interfere with FERC's regulatory authority by adjusting wholesale electricity rates. [Read Summary Online]
(2) CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: 22 U.S.C. §8772, a provision of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, does not violate constraints placed on the Executive and Legislative Branches by the separation of powers principles in the Constitution. [Read Summary Online]
(3) CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: The State of Arizona did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment when the redrawing of the State legislative districts resulted in a population deviation of 8.8%. [Read Summary Online]
(4) CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: The Constitution does not permit Nevada to award damages against California agencies under Nevada law that are greater than it could award against Nevada agencies in similar circumstances. [Read Summary Online]
(5) CRIMINAL LAW: Defendants may be criminally liable for conspiring to violate the Hobbs Act if the government can prove that the defendant agreed with the property owner to acquire that property under color of official right. [Read Summary Online]
(6) CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: Collateral petitioners convicted under the Armed Career Criminal Act may seek retroactive relief consistent with the Court’s prior ruling that the residual clause of the Act is void for vagueness. [Read Summary Online]
(7) FIRST AMENDMENT: Employers may be held liable under the First Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for demoting an employee in an attempt to prevent them from engaging in political activity protected by the First Amendment, even if the employer is factually mistaken about the nature of their employee’s activity. [Read Summary Online]
CERTIORARI
(1) APPELLATE PROCEDURE: Whether Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(b)(2) should allow for the ripening of premature notices of appeal in criminal matters, filed after sentencing judgments but before entry of deferred restitution judgments, after the final judgment is entered? [Read Summary Online]
(2) COPYRIGHT: Whether the standard analytical test is the appropriate test to determine which portions of an article can be copyrighted? [Read Summary Online]
(3) CORPORATIONS: Whether “scheme to defraud a financial institution” in subsection (1) of the bank-fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. §1344, requires proof of a specific intent not only to deceive, but also to cheat a bank? [Read Summary Online]
(4) PATENTS: “Whether and to what extent the defense of laches may bar a claim for patent infringement brought within the Patent Act’s six-year statutory limitations period, 35 U.S.C. § 286?” [Read Summary Online]
DECISIONS
Date Filed: April 19, 2016
Case #: 14-614
GINSBURG, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and KENNEDY, BREYER, ALITO, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined. SOTOMAYOR, J., filed a concurring opinion. THOMAS, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
Full Text Opinion: http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/15pdf/14-614_k5fm.pdf
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: States may not implement programs which interfere with FERC's regulatory authority by adjusting wholesale electricity rates.
Under the Federal Power Act ("FPA"), the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC") has exclusive jurisdiction over wholesale sales of electricity in the interstate market.  States may only regulate retail sales. FERC's two pertinent rules are: (1) the Minimum Offer Price Rule ("MOPR") requires new generators to bid a certain price; and (2) New Entry Price Adjustments ("NEPA") guarantees new generators a stable capacity price for the first three years. Maryland promulgated an order shortly after FERC rejected a proposal that FERC extend the duration of NEPA from three years to ten years.  Maryland sought to improve in-state development of electricity generation and enacted its own regulatory program requiring "load serving entities" ("LSE") to enter into a 20-year pricing contract "for differences" which differed from the wholesale rate FERC requires. Maryland's program contravenes the FPA's "regulatory turf" by adjusting the interstate wholesale rate.  The Fourth Circuit found Maryland's program to be an impermissible intrusion into FERC's exclusive domain as established by Congress. The Supreme Court agreed and rejected Maryland's program "only because it disregards an interstate wholesale rate required by FERC."  The Court left open the possibility of States encouraging new electricity generators through measures which are not tied to wholesale market participation. AFFIRMED.
[Summarized by: Shallon Beatty]
Date Filed: April 20, 2016
Case #: 14-770
GINSBURG, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which KENNEDY, BREYER, ALITO, and KAGAN, JJ., joined, and in all but Part II–C of which THOMAS, J., joined. ROBERTS, C. J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which SOTOMAYOR, J., joined.
Full Text Opinion: http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/15pdf/14-770_9o6b.pdf
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: 22 U.S.C. §8772, a provision of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, does not violate constraints placed on the Executive and Legislative Branches by the separation of powers principles in the Constitution.
Respondents number more than 1,000 victims of Iran-sponsored acts of terrorism, and rank within 16 discrete groups, each of which brought a lawsuit against Iran pursuant to the exception in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FISA) for victims of state-sponsored terrorism. Congress passed §502 of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human rights Act of 2012. §8772 of the Act provides that a court, upon specific findings, may use financial assets held at a New York bank to satisfy compensatory damages awarded against Iran for personal injury or death caused by the acts of terrorism enumerated in FISA terrorism exception. United States v. Klein, 13 Wall. 128, established that Congress may not impose legislation that impairs or directs the power of the judicial or executive branches. Petitioners argue that §8772 violates the Congressional separation of powers compels the courts to reach a predetermined result in their pending case. As such, petitioner argues, §8772 conflicts with the Court’s findings in Klein. However, the Court in Plaut, 514 U.S. at 226, held that Congress may direct courts to apply newly enacted, outcome-altering legislation in pending civil cases. A statute does not violate the independence of the Judiciary when it directs courts to apply a new legal standard to undisputed facts because in doing so, courts determine whether any particular action violates the new prescription. Furthermore, because the respondents number more than 1000, and because the Court gives greater deference to Congress when Congress grants authority regarding foreign affairs, the controlling role of the political branches in enacting §8772 is both necessary and proper. Therefore, §8772 does not violate Congressional separation of powers. AFFIRMED.
[Summarized by: Melissa Vollono]
Date Filed: April 20, 2016
Case #: 14-232
BREYER, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Full Text Opinion: http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/15pdf/14-232_ihdj.pdf
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: The State of Arizona did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment when the redrawing of the State legislative districts resulted in a population deviation of 8.8%.
Arizona redraws the State’s 30 legislative districts after a census is completed every 10 years. In 2010 they redrew the districts and the Department of Justice approved a revised plan with a population deviation of 8.8%. A group of Arizona voters challenged the redistricting plan arguing that it was inadequately equal in population; therefore it violated the Fourteenth Amendment. A Federal District Court ruled in favor of the Respondent, holding that the population deviations were predominantly an outcome of honest efforts to comply with the Voting Rights Act and was not a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court held that minor deviations from mathematical equality, specifically deviations under 10%, do not prove a prima facie case of discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment. Where the deviation is less than 10%, a Petitioner must display that it is more likely than not that the deviation reveals the prevalence of illegitimate considerations. The deviations present showed that the Respondent aimed at complying with the Voting Rights Act and not towards securing political advantage for one party over another, therefore the Petitioner did not meet their burden of proving that it was more likely that the deviation revealed improper considerations. AFFIRMED
[Summarized by: Aimee Costa]
Date Filed: April 19, 2016
Case #: No. 14–1175
BREYER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which KENNEDY, GINSBURG, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined. ALITO, J., concurred in the judgment. ROBERTS, C. J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which THOMAS, J., joined.
Full Text Opinion: http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/15pdf/14-1175_c07d.pdf
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: The Constitution does not permit Nevada to award damages against California agencies under Nevada law that are greater than it could award against Nevada agencies in similar circumstances.
California claimed respondent owed millions in taxes, penalties, and interest. Respondent filed suit in Nevada state court, which claimed jurisdiction over petitioner tax agency under Nevada v. Hall, 440 U. S. 410, seeking damages for petitioner’s alleged abusive audit. The U. S. Supreme Court affirmed the Nevada Supreme Court’s ruling that Nevada courts, as a matter of comity, would immunize California to the same extent that Nevada law should immunize its own agencies and officials, see Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 538 U. S. 488.  At trial respondent was awarded almost $500 million in damages. Petitioner argued that Art. IV, §1, Full Faith and Credit Clause, required Nevada to limit damages to $50,000, the maximum that Nevada law would permit in a similar suit against its own officials. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed $1 million of the award and ordered a retrial on another damages issue, stating that the $50,000 statutory limit would not apply on remand because California’s system of agency control was inadequate to protect Nevada’s citizens. The US Supreme Court vacated and remanded, holding that Nevada’s disregarding of its own normal legal principles employs a constitutionally impermissible “ ‘policy of hostility to the public Acts’ of a sister State” and lacks the “healthy regard for California’s sovereign status” that was the hallmark of its prior holding. The Court found that Nevada’s hostility toward California was evident in its decision to devise a discriminatory damages rule that applied only to a sister State. VACATED and REMANDED.
[Summarized by: Rachel Pavlich]
Date Filed: May 2, 2016
Case #: 14-361
ALITO, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which KENNEDY, GINSBURG, BREYER, and KAGAN, JJ., joined. BREYER, J., filed a concurring opinion. THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion. SOTOMAYOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ROBERTS, C. J., joined.
Full Text Opinion: http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/15pdf/14-361_db8e.pdf
CRIMINAL LAW: Defendants may be criminally liable for conspiring to violate the Hobbs Act if the government can prove that the defendant agreed with the property owner to acquire that property under color of official right.
Petitioner was a police officer with the Baltimore Police Department when he entered into a kickback scheme with owners of an auto repair shop. The scheme entailed Petitioner, as well as nine other Baltimore Police Officers, convincing car owners involved in car accidents to have their vehicles brought to said auto shop in return for monetary incentives. Petitioner was ultimately convicted of violating the Hobbs Act for receiving money under color of official right as well as conspiring to violate the Hobbs Act. Petitioner appealed his conspiracy conviction to the Fourth Circuit, arguing that the crime required the conspirators to have agreed to acquire money from individual outside of the conspiracy. The Fourth Circuit disagreed and rejected Petitioner’s argument, resulting in this appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts, holding that Petitioner only had to agree with “specific intent that the underlying crime be committed” by co-conspirators, regardless of whether the auto shop owners were incapable of committing the substantive offense. The Supreme Court looked to traditional constructions of conspiracy in holding that the government only needed to prove that Petitioner and each co-conspirator intended for some member of the conspiracy to perform each individual element of the substantive offense.  The Supreme Court found that Petitioner had such an intent, and that even though the auto shop owners were incapable of committing the underlying offense of obtaining money from another in principal, Petitioner satisfied this element of the offense and Petitioner was therefore engaged in a conspiracy with the auto shop owners. AFFIRMED.
[Summarized by: Adam Mentzer]
Date Filed: April 18, 2016
Case #: 15-6418
KENNEDY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and GINSBURG, BREYER, ALITO, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined. THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
Full Text Opinion: http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/15pdf/15-6418_2q24.pdf
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: Collateral petitioners convicted under the Armed Career Criminal Act may seek retroactive relief consistent with the Court’s prior ruling that the residual clause of the Act is void for vagueness.
In 2010, Petitioner pled guilty to possession of a firearm. At the time he entered his plea, Petitioner had three prior felony convictions, including a “strong-arm robbery” charge. Under the Armed Career Criminal Act, a felon who violates the act by possessing a firearm after three prior felony convictions for "violent felon[ies]" is subjected to a minimum sentence of fifteen years. The maximum sentence for felons found in possession of a firearm is ordinarily ten years in Petitioner’s jurisdiction. While this case was pending, the Supreme Court held in Johnson that the part of the definition of “violent felony” known as the residual clauses that extends the definition to  “conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another” was void for vagueness. Meanwhile, Petitioner was denied post-conviction relief in district court and by the Eleventh Circuit, despite asserting the void for vagueness argument that ultimately prevailed in Johnson. The Supreme Court disagreed with the lower courts and held that Johnson applied retroactively on collateral petitions. The Court reasoned that new substantive rules may be applied retroactively and those merely functioning as procedural rules may not. It then determined that Johnson is a substantive rule, because it functionally limits the degree of punishment levied on defendants targeted by the statute, and therefore qualifies for retroactive application. VACATED and REMANDED.
[Summarized by: Corey Riley]
Date Filed: April 26, 2016
Case #: 14-1280
BREYER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and KENNEDY, GINSBURG, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined. THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ALITO, J., joined.
Full Text Opinion: http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/15pdf/14-1280_k5fl.pdf
FIRST AMENDMENT: Employers may be held liable under the First Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for demoting an employee in an attempt to prevent them from engaging in political activity protected by the First Amendment, even if the employer is factually mistaken about the nature of their employee’s activity.
Petitioner worked as a police detective when he picked up a campaign sign for his mother that endorsed a mayoral candidate running against the incumbent mayor, who had appointed the Chief of Police as well as Petitioner’s direct supervisor. Fellow officers saw Petitioner at one of the candidate’s distribution centers holding the sign and the following day Petitioner’s supervisor demoted Petitioner to patrol officer in retaliation for what the supervisor incorrectly perceived as involvement with the campaign. Petitioner filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in federal court. The district court found that Petitioner’s First Amendment rights were not violated because he had not engaged in protected conduct and that conduct protected by the First Amendment must be actual and not perceived to be actionable. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that employees are entitled to bring claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the First Amendment when their employers demote them and intend to demote them in order to prevent them from engaging in political activity protected by the First Amendment, regardless of whether the employer was mistaken about the employees conduct. The Supreme Court found that the First Amendment’s textual focus on government conduct and concern about discouraging individuals from engaging in protected speech justified holding employers liable. It was further noted that the chilling effect on protected speech is the same with or without a factual mistake on behalf of the employer regarding the conduct of their employees. REVERSED and REMANDED.  
[Summarized by: Adam Mentzer]
CERTIORARI
Date Filed: April 25, 2016
Case #: 15–7250
618 F. App’x 579 (11th Cir. 2015)
Full Text Opinion: http://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/unpub/files/201413029.pdf
APPELLATE PROCEDURE: Whether Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(b)(2) should allow for the ripening of premature notices of appeal in criminal matters, filed after sentencing judgments but before entry of deferred restitution judgments, after the final judgment is entered?
Petitioner pled guilty to possession of material involving a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct. Petitioner was sentenced to prison and was also ordered to pay mandatory restitution in an amount to be determined at a later time. Following the court’s judgment, Petitioner filed a notice of appeal. While Petitioner’s appeal was pending, the district court entered a second final judgment that mirrored the first final judgment, except that the amount of restitution was stated. Both parties addressed the sentence and the amount of restitution in their briefs on appeal, but the Eleventh Circuit decided sua sponte that, absent a notice of appeal by Petitioner challenging the second final judgment, the court did not have jurisdiction to decide that issue. Petitioner brought this appeal, arguing that Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(b)(2) allows for prematurely made notice of appeals in criminal cases filed after sentencing to mature after the entry of deferred restitution judgments. Petitioner posits that eight other circuits already support this interpretation of Rule 4(b) (2) and that a decision is necessary to resolve the remaining circuit splits. Petitioner further argues that Courts of Appeals already have jurisdiction over premature notices of appeal pursuant to existing case law that determined that timeliness of an appeal in criminal matters is not significant for jurisdiction. 
[Summarized by: Adam Mentzer]
Date Filed: May 2, 2016
Case #: 15-866
799 F.3d 468 (6th Cir. 2015)
Full Text Opinion: http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/15a0194p-06.pdf
COPYRIGHT: Whether the standard analytical test is the appropriate test to determine which portions of an article can be copyrighted?
Respondent is the manufacturer of athletic clothing, including cheerleading uniforms. In order to design the clothing, the respondent employs designers. Respondent copyrighted several of their design sketches of uniforms. This suit was initiated when respondent noticed petitioner using some of their sketches or some that appeared to be similar. Cert was granted to resolve a circuit split regarding the applicable test to determine which portions of an article can be copyrighted. Petitioner is arguing for the implementation of the standard analytical test due to an increase in predictability throughout the circuits. The Sixth Circuit rejected this test and created their own test for determining when a copyright violation exists. As of now, there are ten distinct tests in the circuit courts for making this determination. A uniform test will resolve this tension among the courts. Additionally, the test created by the Sixth Circuit leads to inconsistent results, creates a conflict with the long standing tradition of refusing to issue copyrights for clothing, and produces results in conflict with the Congressional purpose of creating consistent case law within the scope of copyright protection. Petitioner also suggests that the Sixth Circuit approach is inconsistent with the value the Copyright office has placed on clothing designs. 
[Summarized by: Kymber Lattin]
Date Filed: April 25, 2016
Case #: 15-5991
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
Full Text Opinion: http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2015/03/27/13-50136.pdf
CORPORATIONS: Whether “scheme to defraud a financial institution” in subsection (1) of the bank-fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. §1344, requires proof of a specific intent not only to deceive, but also to cheat a bank?
After impersonating a bank customer in order to defraud a customer’s account using PayPal, Petitioner was charged with violating the bank-fraud statute 18 U.S.C. §1344(1). At trial, Petitioner sought a jury instruction that the government had to prove that Petitioner specifically intended to make the bank the principal target of the fraud, as opposed to the PayPal account holder. The district court refused to give the instruction, finding instead that 1344(1) required proof only that the defendant intended to deceive the bank, not that he also intended the bank to bear the loss. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit refused to hold that the bank needed to be the intended victim of the financial fraud. Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit’s case law establishes that § 1344(1)’s element of intent “to defraud,” does not include intent to financially victimize the bank. Therefore, the district court’s conviction was affirmed by Ninth Circuit. Petitioner alleges that the Ninth Circuit’s minority view decision only accentuated a split in the Courts of Appeals on an issue of substantial practical importance. Petitioner alleges that nine courts have held, contrary to the Ninth Circuit’s decision, that §1344(1)’s “scheme to defraud” requires proof of an intent to deceive and cheat a bank. Petitioner also alleges that the Ninth Circuit minority-view decision is contrary to the Court’s jurisprudence, which held that the essence of traditional fraud is the intent to cheat another via deception. 
[Summarized by: Melissa Vollono]
Date Filed: May 2, 2016
Case #: 15-927
Court Below: 807 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
Full Text Opinion: http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/sca-hygiene-products-aktiebolag-v-first-quality-baby-products-llc/
PATENTS: “Whether and to what extent the defense of laches may bar a claim for patent infringement brought within the Patent Act’s six-year statutory limitations period, 35 U.S.C. § 286?”
Petitioner is a patent holder for a design of protective underwear. Respondent began emulating the design and was asked to stop by Petitioner. Respondent argued that Petitioner’s patent was invalid because of a previously issued patent. Before filing suit, Petitioner sought a reexamination of its patent from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO). The PTO took three years to validate the Petitioner’s original patent. Two years and four months after the end of the reexamination and six years and eleven months after Petitioner’s first correspondence with Respondent, Petitioner then filed in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Kentucky. The U.S. District Court granted summary judgment for Respondent on the defense of laches and estoppel. Petitioner appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. While the case was still pending, the Court decidedPetrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., which held that the defense of laches cannot preclude an award of damages for copyright infringement during the Copyright Act’s three-year period of limitation. Petitioner argued that a genuine link existed between the decision under the Copyright Act inPetrella and their current case under the Patent Act. The Federal Circuit reversed in part as to the estoppel defense, but affirmed in part as to the defense of laches. Petitioner first argues that the Patent Act makes no mention of the laches defense and so the Court should go no further in its interpretation of the statute. Second, Congress enacted a six-year uniform period of limitations, which the Court may not circumvent. Third, the Federal Circuit’s decision conflicts with the Court’s decision in Petrella. Lastly, Petitioner argues that the Federal Circuit’s “unitary claim” presumption is inconsistent with the Court’s separate-accrual rule.
[Summarized by: Grant Elder]

UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT NEWS
Willamette Law Online – Willamette University College of Law
Editor-in-Chief: Dan Olsen, dolsen@willamette.edu

US Supreme Court Editors:
Adam Mentzer, amentzer@willamette.edu
Aimee Costa, acosta@willamette.edu
Jacalyn Boyle, jboyle@willamette.edu

US Supreme Court Senior Writers: Shallon Beatty, Kymber Lattin, Rachel Pavlich
US Supreme Court Writers: Melissa Vollono, Grant Elder, Corey Riley, Megan Oshiro

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Note:  Willamette Law Online functions as a notification service, alerting users to legal decisions and trends, and is neither intended to be a comprehensive resource of case law nor a substitute for in-depth legal research. If the Supreme Court posts Orders granting Certiorari before 12:00 pm (PT), then the notification containing the daily Certiorari summaries will be sent out the same day. If the Supreme Court posts an Order granting Certiorari after 12:00 pm (PT), then the notification containing the daily Certiorari summaries will be sent out the following business day.  
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