CATHERINE HUTCHINSON, BY HER GUARDIAN,

http://www.publicjustice.net/Repository/Files/Hutchinson-decision-021711.pdf

Case: 10-1268 Document: 00116172778 Date Filed: 02/17/2011 Entry ID: 5527328
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 10-1268

CATHERINE HUTCHINSON, BY HER GUARDIAN, SANDY JULIEN, ET AL.,

Plaintiffs, Appellees,

v.

DEVAL L. PATRICK, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS GOVERNOR
OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, ET AL.,

Defendants, Appellants.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT


FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Michael A. Ponsor, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Lynch, Chief Judge,
Selya and Howard, Circuit Judges.

Jennifer Grace Miller, Assistant Attorney General, with whom

Martha Coakley, Attorney General, was on brief, for appellants.

Steven J. Schwartz, with whom Kathryn Rucker, J. Paterson Rae,

Center for Public Representation, Richard A. Johnston, Michael R.

Dube and WilmerHale were on brief, for appellees.

Jeffrey S. Follett, Brian P. Bialas, and Foley Hoag LLP on
brief for AARP, Center for Law and Education, Inc., Lawyers'
Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, National Consumer Law Center,
Inc., National Health Law Program, Inc., Public Citizen, Inc., The
Judge David L. Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law, National
Disability Rights Network, Inc., Public Justice, P.C., Women's Bar
Association of Massachusetts, Massachusetts Law Reform Institute,
Inc., ARC Massachusetts, Inc., American Civil Liberties Union
Foundation of Massachusetts, Disabilities Rights Center, Inc.,

Disability Law Center, Inc., Disability Rights Center, Greater
Boston Legal Services, Inc., Legal Assistance Corporation of
Central Massachusetts, Rhode Island Disability Law Center, Inc.,

South Coastal Counties Legal Services, Inc., and Western
Massachusetts Legal Services, Inc., amici curiae.

February 17, 2011

SELYA, Circuit Judge. This appeal requires us to
consider the circumstances under which a litigant who obtains
significant relief through a court-approved settlement, rather than
a verdict or a formal consent decree, may achieve "prevailing
party" status and, thus, become eligible for an award of attorneys'
fees under a typical federal fee-shifting statute. The appeal also
requires us to consider when, short of the entry of a final
judgment, "prevailing party" status may attach.
These questions (and the other questions before us) arise

in the following setting. After the parties reached a negotiated
settlement resolving the substance of a complicated class action,
the district court awarded the plaintiffs attorneys' fees and
expenses totaling over three-quarters of a million dollars. The
defendants appeal, asseverating that the district court improperly

characterized the plaintiffs as prevailing parties; acted
prematurely in arriving at that conclusion; and to add insult to
injury, set the amount of the award too generously. We conclude
that the district court appropriately characterized the plaintiffs
as prevailing parties, that the relief obtained was sufficiently
final to justify a fee award, and that the court acted within the
purview of its discretion in fixing the amount. Consequently, we
affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

On May 17, 2007, the named plaintiffs — several
individuals with acquired brain injuries who qualify for long-term
care services under the Medicaid program and two organizations
devoted to their cause (the Brain Injury Association of
Massachusetts and the Stavros Center for Independent Living) —
filed suit to compel the defendants — various officials of the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts (collectively, the Commonwealth) — to
comply with Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),
42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12165, section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29

U.S.C. § 794(a), and the reasonable promptness provision of the

Medicaid program as set forth in the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396a(a)(8), (a)(10)(A), by offering services and programs for
individuals with acquired brain injuries in integrated community
settings. The Commonwealth filed an answering motion, which
triggered a spate of motion practice.

On July 13, 2007, the plaintiffs moved for class
certification. They then served an array of discovery requests.
The Commonwealth cross-moved to stay discovery pending a decision
on class certification. The district court granted a stay.
On September 26, 2007, the court certified a class.
Shortly thereafter, the parties began settlement negotiations in
earnest and agreed to suspend discovery while negotiations
proceeded. The talks proved fruitful and, on May 30, 2008, the
parties executed a settlement agreement (the Agreement) that they
described as "final" and "comprehensive."

In terms, the Agreement required the Commonwealth, over
a period of years, to expand community services (residential and
non-residential) for Medicaid-eligible individuals with acquired
brain injuries. To this end, the Commonwealth is charged with
developing several new projects and programs. The Commonwealth's
responsibilities are, however, subject to its ability to secure
both funding from the state legislature and necessary approvals
from the federal government. With respect to these matters, the
Agreement impresses an obligation on the Commonwealth to use best
efforts. If the Commonwealth is unable to obtain funding or
approvals and the Agreement stalls, either side may move to vacate
the settlement so that the plaintiffs can litigate the case.
The Agreement contemplates that the case will remain open
for a period of years while the Commonwealth performs thereunder;
it authorizes dismissal of the action only after the Commonwealth

has completed certain specified obligations and is found to be in
"substantial compliance" with the Agreement's terms. The Agreement
further provides that the district court "shall retain jurisdiction
to hear and adjudicate noncompliance motions."

Because the district court had certified a class, the
Agreement required judicial approval. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e).
The parties jointly moved for this approval and, after a
preliminary fairness hearing, the district court allowed the
approval process to move forward. The court acknowledged, at the
Commonwealth's urging, that the Agreement memorialized a settlement
and was not tendered as a consent decree.

After the class members were notified of the proposed
settlement, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(1), the district court held
a final fairness hearing. The court again noted that the Agreement
"does not constitute a consent decree but is a settlement agreement
of this disputed case." The plaintiffs suggested that the court
approve the Agreement by entering it as a court order, but the
Commonwealth objected. The court expressed its willingness to

indicate, either orally or through a written order, its finding
that the Agreement represented a fair and appropriate resolution of
the matter. It then asked the parties to submit a draft of a
proposed order for approval of the Agreement.

On July 29, 2008, each side submitted a proposed order.
The parties disagreed as to whether the court needed explicitly to
retain jurisdiction as a means of facilitating subsequent
enforcement of the Agreement. In an effort to achieve a meeting of
the minds, the district court suggested the following language:
[T]he court approves the comprehensive

settlement agreement. This case will not be
closed and judgment will not enter pending
compliance with the terms of the settlement
agreement.

This suggestion did not please anyone. The plaintiffs feared that,
without language explicitly retaining enforcement jurisdiction, the
court's authority might be questioned in the event that further
compliance proceedings become necessary. For its part, the
Commonwealth expressed concern that the court's words might be
transformed into the functional equivalent of a consent decree.
The Commonwealth noted that, in the course of settlement
negotiations, it had consistently maintained its unwillingness to
resolve the case by means of "a document that could be functionally
a consent decree."

Faced with this impasse, the district court took the
matter under advisement. On September 18, 2008, the court, acting
without further input from the parties, entered a final approval
order. The order states in pertinent part:
[T]he court finds that the Comprehensive

Settlement Agreement is fair, reasonable, and
adequate. Therefore, the court approves the
Comprehensive Settlement Agreement, noting

that the parties agree that this agreement
does not constitute a consent decree, and that
the court will retain jurisdiction over the
case. The court orders that this case not be
closed and that judgment not enter pending
compliance with the terms of the Comprehensive

Settlement Agreement.

The entry of the approval order set the stage for the
developments leading to this appeal. The plaintiffs, claiming to
be prevailing parties, moved for an award of attorneys' fees
(including costs) in the amount of $786,123. The Commonwealth 1
disputed the "prevailing party" characterization, the timing of the

motion for fees, and the reasonableness of the requested award.
The district court found that the plaintiffs were prevailing
parties, that fees were presently allowable, and that the amount
sought was "eminently fair." Accordingly, it awarded the

plaintiffs the full amount sought. This timely appeal followed.